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TO: S/P - Mr. Rostov
FROM: S/P - L. W. Fuller
SUBJECT: Reflections on the Cuban Crisis

A survey of the last week's developments through the acute stage of the Cuban crisis, and of numerous analytical and interpretative comments it has elicited, suggests the following observations on two key aspects:

1. Updating the Monroe Doctrine

The "Kennedy Doctrine" as pronounced on October 22 is a new variant and special application of the central thesis of the Monroe Doctrine, enunciated in 1823. Incidentally it is worthy of note that Russia was very much involved then - due to her membership in the Holy Alliance and the Tsarist ukase that seemed to threaten permanent Russian colonization of Western North America.

Since then, there have been an assortment of emergencies and challenges to Western Hemisphere integrity, and hence to US security. Several Presidents responded - Cleveland to Britain's unwillingness to arbitrate the Venezuelan boundary dispute; Theodore Roosevelt to European disposition to intervene for forcible collection of debts; Wilson to a chaotic situation south of the border that could provoke international involvement.

Franklin Roosevelt and his successors have, to some degree, broadened the Doctrine to include arrangements for collective hemisphere defense. Its essence, nevertheless, remains the US determination to prevent any incursion

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of hostile

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of hostile, external power into the hemisphere, by unilateral act if necessary.

Earlier Presidents acted to meet the changing requirements of US and hemispheric security in novel situations. President Kennedy has acted similarly, but in a situation of unprecedented novelty and challenge. In the interest of clarity, these changed circumstances should be noted:

a. The US, since 1941, has become deeply and lastingly involved, in fact inextricably implicated in the affairs of Europe and other overseas areas. Swiftly advancing technology has created the physical necessity for interdependence of all peoples and regions - economically, respecting security, and in some degree politically as well. This situation, in effect, invalidates that part of the Monroe Doctrine whereby we foreswore an interest in Europe and any concern with its affairs.

b. Nuclear weapons and long-range delivery vehicles expose all areas to remote attack and even destruction. The Monroe Doctrine assumed a high degree of invulnerability of this hemisphere from external attack - an assumption true in its day, but no longer valid.

c. The US finds itself, quite involuntarily but by the compulsions of history, leading a world-wide coalition in a still essentially bipolar struggle with a hostile power complex. This contrasts sharply with the relative isolation of the US in the world areas in 1823, and down to the turn of the century.

The question inevitably arises and must be faced - what of the essence of the Doctrine is still vital, valid and applicable under present circumstances?

In view of radically altered conditions, I feel that we will be in trouble if we insist on the Doctrine in its

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pristine purity, and as a unilateral assertion of US policy (as it was originally - recall that Monroe opposed Canning's suggestion that it be a joint US-British declaration) and as unique among the policies of nations.

The "case for symmetry" of US missiles located in European countries bordering the USSR (e. g. Turkey), though inexact, if not entirely specious, is not without its appeal in logic and equity. If collective defense is to be broadened, regionally or universally, as sanctioned by the UN Charter, why not a Khrushchev "Doctrine" to justify missiles in Soviet allied territory peripheral to the US?

Moreover, the argument that Soviet missiles in Cuba are offensive while ours in Turkey are defensive is a plain, subjective rationalization. In the nuclear era, defense by nuclear weapons must mean deterrence, for actual use means mutual destruction and not genuine defense. To deter, missiles must have a range sufficient to threaten the territory, and the military and population centers of a putative enemy.

Nor is the argument that such emplacement is intolerable because it upsets the existing international balance of power entirely convincing. This balance is always precarious and shifting. Such a threat as Soviet action in Cuba is real and grave and must be met - but on some better rationale than this.

Soviet behavior is rooted in the long and bitter experience of the Russian past. Russians have slowly forged a giant nation over centuries of embroilment with countless invaders and adversaries. They have fought the wild Tartars - and the sophisticated war machine of modern Germany. As a nation, they are retarded in international outlook and "feel" for the requirements of the world community of which they are so important a part. As Kennan has pointed out, Soviet views often have little relevance to world realities. Thus there is a dangerous vein of egocentricity in Russian - and Soviet history.

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As I see it, the Soviets have long resented living "under the nuclear gun," as they did for a decade or more after 1945 without compensatory and balancing nuclear power of their own. This accounts for their opposition to overseas bases, to a rearmed Germany with access to nuclear weapons, to the West Berlin enclave, and to NATO and its nuclear strategy. They have striven mightily to compensate and equalize this imbalance.

Their acquisition of an ICBM capability, added to IRBM capabilities against NATO Europe, were moves toward this goal. Now the temptation to bring the nuclear threat closer to the US by building bases in Cuba has proved irresistible. Soviet purpose is offensive, by our criteria. They may see it as deterrent in effect, to influence and restrain US actions, not only vis-a-vis Cuba but elsewhere. To us it is nuclear blackmail. We have found it intolerable and have acted - I believe as any administration must have acted in the context. But the broader issues remain unresolved.

It is my conviction that the Monroe Doctrine in its central essence of hemispheric defense can be salvaged and perpetuated, but only as it is subsumed in the collective security doctrine sanctioned by the UN Charter, and exemplified regionally in the OAS and the Rio Treaty, NATO, and other bilateral and multilateral pacts. We have, in the Cuban crisis, already emphasized this point, acting not only unilaterally but through the OAS and UN. We have demonstrated "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind" by candidly informing allies, neutrals and enemies alike.

Our actions will command respect in so far as they conform to such an interpretation and application of the Doctrine. We can not revert to any "Olney Doctrine" that declares US fiat to be law anywhere in this hemisphere. And we must, ultimately, face the issue so sharply posed now by Soviet action, that we live in no privileged sanctuary, that other strong nations, in a world lacking a universal security

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system and international restraints on armaments, will cherish their own concepts of national security and act accordingly.

There must be an earnest and sustained effort to reach international understanding on what acts are acceptable in the name of "nuclear defense and deterrence" (this would be one major facet of negotiating "ground rules" for US-Soviet relations, for surely here, if anywhere, is an area of overlapping interest). De-nuclearized zones along borders of present nuclear powers would be one of many tracks to be explored - although it must be done soon to be effective, as proliferation of nuclear weapons now in course would almost hopelessly complicate this particular arrangement. Above all, the crisis points to the urgent need for accelerated arms control agreements, for without such controls there are certain to be further crises with a high probability of ultimate disaster ahead.

Latest developments indicate that we have won one round. But this one week's confrontation and clash only clarifies the larger issues that must be resolved if succeeding events are not to bring intolerable danger of war.

2. Consultation with Allies

The reaction of our NATO and most other allies to the US Cuban action has been gratifyingly affirmative. There have been exceptions, of which three might be cited - Italy, Norway, and Canada. Although even these have given official concurrence, there have been doubts and reservations. Fanfani has been somewhat reserved because of the delicacy of his internal political situation. His Government rests on support of both Socialist parties, and both Nenni and Saragat have been highly critical of our Cuban move. Norway is perhaps influenced by her precarious proximity to the USSR. External Affairs Minister Green of Canada was extremely ambiguous and evasive in a TV interview on the Cuban crisis.

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It must be noted that the general support for our action in the allied world is to a large degree a reflex of the dependence of these states upon us for their basic, essential security. Most of them felt that they had, in their own interest, no real alternative to supporting US policy. This was deeply felt by officialdom, even though in all countries there were vocal and sometimes substantial segments of opinion openly opposed to the US action.

Yet there has been a very perceptible feeling of resentment, even though not openly expressed, among Allied leaders. This feeling, I believe, arises not so much at what we did - the President's action was strongly supported by virtually all our major Allies - but because they were given no opportunity to express their views at an early enough stage to voice doubts or approval, to make positive suggestions, to at least have an opportunity to influence our decision. In short, they feel that, although we carefully informed them before the action, we did not consult them. This feeling goes deep because such episodes as the Cuban crisis bring an imminent threat of war which will inevitably draw them in. The sense of relief now felt as the crisis seems - at least immediately - averted is a measure of the intensity of allied concern.

Our failure to consult at a sufficiently early stage was seen, or at least openly avowed, by many leaders as due to the fact that a crisis had swiftly developed demanding quick decision and precluding real consultation. But, in my opinion, another explanation may have been in the minds of some - namely, that the US, having made up its mind, feared that early consultation with its Allies might embarrass and inhibit the desired action.

This situation points to a more or less inevitable inadequacy in coalition diplomacy. Unless, in a crunch, the power of decision is assumed by one strong member, a coalition is severely handicapped versus a hostile power-complex where such power of decision is organically centered in one power.

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The Cuban

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The Cuban crisis raises this issue of inter-allied consultation in a vivid fashion. It has often arisen before - most dramatically in the Suez crisis of November, 1956. It is a chronic dilemma. Ever since the Report of the NATO "Three Wise Men" in December 1956, efforts have been continuous to improve NATO's consultative mechanisms and methods. There has been considerable improvement - but not in respect to joint decisions in crisis situations. These, by their very nature, are extremely refractory to the consultative process.

Yet the evolution of NATO Europe, and especially of the Six with possible addition of the UK, foreshadows clearly the necessity for something better than the present arrangement whereby a power such as the US acts unilaterally in a matter affecting the security of all (we had previously urged the indivisibility of NATO security interests where Cuba was concerned), and then asks for certe blanche approval of its action. So formidable an aggregate as united Europe can not long be expected to follow in our train in matters deeply relevant to European security, accepting our rationale, conforming unquestioningly to our decisions and actions.

Hence the Cuban crisis underlines the urgency of grappling anew with the problem of consultation in NATO (already spotted as a National Security Policy Planning Task). This effort should seek to come to grips with the special and critical aspect of the problem highlighted by current developments. As the situation further unfolds, and perhaps comes to involve many other related problems (overseas bases, de-nuclearised zones, regional arms control, Berlin), NATO consultation should be increasingly a genuinely collective policy-deciding enterprise.

So long as sovereign states exist and differ markedly in their power potentials and political responsibilities, the problem can never be entirely resolved. But there can be great improvement. In fact, I suspect there must be if the alliance is to survive...

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I suggest two lines of approach (we discussed these fully in the Department's NATO Working Group of 1956, preparatory to the "Wise Men's" Report on Non-military Co-operation in NATO).

First, there should be maximum effort on the part of each member to refrain from unilateral action in matters affecting the alliance except after consultation sufficiently in advance of action to permit other governments to discuss, present suggestions and counterproposals, or merely to have advance notice enabling them to bring their own policies into line with the action to be taken. Such advance consultation would not, of course, bind the power contemplating action deemed essential to its security. This approach would be a most useful supplement to our anticipatory crisis planning.

Second, through consultation there should be a continuous effort to fashion agreed NATO policies in areas where a high convergence of NATO interests is manifest and possibilities of a consensus are good. Some such consensus now exists, as on Berlin. But there is need to enlarge these areas to the end that an agreed NATO policy emerges relevant to as broad a spectrum of problems as possible.

The Cuban problem also points to the need to view the various critical situations on the whole cold war front as related facets of the general conflict and to deal with them accordingly. Cuba, Berlin, the Congo, Southeast Asia and other crisis areas should all fit into one general scheme (it is artificial and anachronistic to consider NATO interests as confined to the NATO treaty area). And this approach is vital to NATO unity, as it provides a common denominator and co-ordinating principle for policies in these diverse areas. A piecemeal, unilateral approach to the handling of crises is disruptive of NATO unity and morale; furthermore it is likely to prove ineffective, as preoccupation with one situation may only encourage the Soviets to make difficulties on other fronts.

A unified

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A unified approach would have these advantages:

a. It would make more feasible the implementation of a central national strategy.

b. It would make more feasible a true harmonization of NATO members' policies, through central planning, co-ordination of national policies, maximizing the possibilities of common NATO policies.

c. It would put us in a better position to negotiate with the USSR from a stance of greater allied solidarity, and because such negotiations could deal with the interrelation of numerous cold war issues on various world fronts.

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